The Grenfell inquiry: the final report

By now, all of us will have read or seen something of the conclusions of Phase 2 of Sir Martin Moore- Bick’s final report into the Grenfell disaster. The report, which runs to over 1,600 pages, provides a comprehensive explanation of the events that culminated in the deaths of 72 people at Grenfell Tower. The report itself is broadly split into 14 parts which reflect the broad remit the Inquiry was given and cover a range of subjects. Some of the chapters are more relevant to us and our clients than others, but as might be expected there are significant sections dealing with the roles, responsibilities and culpabilities of the designers and contractors involved in the refurbishment of the tower. The full report is available on the Inquiry’s website and for those interested in understanding more of the detail, the standalone Executive Summary document is a useful starting point. Much of the press content we have seen deals understandably with the findings that all the lives lost because of the fire were avoidable and that residents were “failed over a number of years by those who were responsible for ensuring [their] safety”. The report contains shocking detail in this regard and the avoidance of a repeat of the disaster is rightly at the top of the agenda. We can reasonably expect our clients to want to understand our views on some specific points and, in this regard, we summarise the key recommendations made by the Inquiry panel and provide some comment where appropriate: This includes both the Executive Summary from the report itself and Chapter 113 which includes the 58 specific recommendations put forward by the Inquiry panel.

Key recommendations

1.

A new regulator and more centralised Government control

The report recommends that a new regulator should be created drawing together a broad number of functions which are currently dealt with by several statutory bodies. This new ‘construction regulator’ would be responsible for: • Regulation of construction products and the development of testing methods and certification regimes. • Regulation and oversight of building control. • Licencing of contractors to work on ‘higher risk’ buildings with a broader meaning as to what constitutes a ‘higher risk’ building.

• Operating as a knowledge hub for researching, collecting and exchanging information on fire safety matters.

Alongside this the Inquiry has recommended that the responsibilities of the various Government departments responsible for the implementation of fire safety are brought together under one Secretary of State to mirror the regulatory picture.

Comment:

We, alongside BIBA, have previously called for more and better regulation of construction products. We supported the Code for Construction Products Information’s attempts at introducing more rigour into the ethical and technical aspects of how products were marketed. Putting all this on a proper regulatory footing is therefore something that can only help our clients and their PI insurers over the longer term. Removing the perceived ‘moral hazard’ which is at the forefront of their Inquiry’s findings will do much to persuade insurers that the bad practices of the past cannot happen again. Equally, ensuring that the performance of products is clearer and more certain can only assist professionals and contractors in specifying appropriate materials. The knowledge hub could also serve as the ‘forum’ that we alongside BIBA and other s have long called for, bringing together regulators, industry and insurers to enhance working processes and reduce risk.

2.

‘Higher risk building’ redefined

The Inquiry has urgently recommended that the definition of a higher risk building is reviewed. They view the current definition (i.e. over 18m and containing at least two residential units) as being too narrow. The Inquiry considers that the use the building is put to is more relevant and, in particular, the “likely presence of vulnerable people [whose] evacuation in the event of fire…would likely to present difficulty”.

Comment:

The logic here is both powerful and understandable and yet, a move along these lines will clearly bring a large swathe of buildings within the ‘higher risk’ regime. It also brings with it practical difficulties around the knowledge or foresight required of those designing and constructing buildings in understanding if and to what extent there are vulnerable people likely to be in any one building. However, it’s almost certain that the Inquiry panel have considered these points and determined that the consequences of doing ‘nothing’ outweigh the potential difficul ties of acting in the way they have recommended.

3.

Chief Construction Adviser

A new Chief Construction Adviser is recommended, who will be able to provide Government with knowledge and practical experience of the industry, including how Building Regulations and guidance are being developed and what is happening in industry more generally.

Comment:

Sharing knowledge is something very close to Griffiths & Armour’s heart and we certainly believe that, properly implemented, there is much to commend this recommendation. Part of the problem we have seen at first hand over the years has been that there is no joined up industry ‘voice’ to speak on behalf of the various construction stakeholders. A well considered adviser, supported by a cross disciplinary and industry team, potentially brings a powerful voice within Government. The role, remit and composition of this new body needs careful consideration.

4.

Legislation

The Inquiry has recommended an urgent review of Approved Document B (covering Fire Safety under the Building Regulations) to address concerns that the document does not provide the information needed to design buildings that are safe. Equally, the Inquiry recommends that it be made clearer that the guidance is just that and nothing more: the legal requirements are contained in the Building Regulations, and they need to be seen as the touchstone in ensuring compliance with the law.

Comment:

Much like the Inquiry itself, it’s not our place to comment on the specific changes required to Building Regulations. A reminder that it is the Regulations themselves and not the accompanying guidance which must be followed seems sensible.

5.

A fire safety strategy for higher risk buildings

The Inquiry found that those involved in the design and construction of the Tower failed to understand how the various fire protection systems worked to ensure its occupants were safe and failed to ensure the strategy started by the fire engineer was finished. The report recommends that it be made a statutory requirement that a registered fire engineer produces a fire safety strategy to be submitted at Gateway 2 and that it is reviewed and re-submitted at Gateway 3.

Comment:

Again, it is for Government and industry to judge the benefits of such a change.

6.

Testing

The two recommendations here relate to the need to develop new testing methods which will deliver accurate information to ensure that the evacuation strategy on a particular building can be carried out reliably. At present, the Inquiry found too much emphasis was placed on judgment, rather than reliable data. Alongside this, the Inquiry expressed concerns with the potential for BS9414 (relating to evaluating changes to systems tested under BS8414) to encourage non-fire engineers to believe they can safely assess a proposed external wall. The Inquiry recommends

that it is made clear that this should not be used as a substitute for an assessment by a qualified fire engineer.

Comment:

These are highly technical areas and, again, it’s not our place to comment .

7.

Certification of products

As mentioned above, a new construction regulator would take on responsibility for assessing the conformity of construction products with legislation and standards and issue certificates. Those certificates should include much more information as regards test results, testing history and any relevant matters which could affect performance.

Comment:

Anything that improves the confidence of professionals to rely on third party certification is to be welcomed. Perhaps the only point we’d make here, though it is one very much for industry, is the potential increased workload in reviewing the expanded documentation that may follow. Clients may need to work to understand just what this means for them and build in sufficient time and resources accordingly.

8.

Fire engineers

The Inquiry recommends that the role and function of a fire engineer should be protected by statute and an independent body be established to regulate the profession, define standards, and maintain a register of members. There are also recommendations around increasing the number of quality courses and to increase the number of competent engineers. Separately they also recommend a body be established to produce a statement of professional skills that should fall within the scope of a fire engineers work so that their scope of work is better understood. The idea of a ‘protected title’ is something we have floated before to address several issues which are prevalent in industry. Indeed, we take the view that perhaps the recommendations should go further, and industry settle on a protected title for a broader range of engineers, perhaps ‘ chartered engineers ’ . Ireland has already gone down this path with the introduction of the Building Control (Amendment) Regulations (BCAR). BCAR ensure that, amongst other things, certification can only be signed off by a Chartered Engineer, Registered Architect or Chartered Surveyor. Time and again in our engagements with clients the belief is raised that engineers simply do not have the status they should rightly command, given their role in society and the training and experience required. The fact that engineers are not, in the UK at least, afforded the same status as solicitors and accountants is simply wrong. It might well be that if this disparity can be corrected, many of the problems which have beset the profession for decades could yet be resolved simply by raising the status of the engineering profession. Comment:

9.

Architects

The Inquiry has recommended that both RIBA and ARB review the steps taken to improve competency within the profession since the disaster to ensure they are sufficient in the light of the findings of the Inquiry. There is also a recommendation that it become a requirement that for work on higher risk buildings, a senior manager of the Principal Designer (BSA) be required to issue a statement that “all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that on completion the building as designed will be as safe as is required by the Building Regula tions”.

Comment:

We have written before of the dangers of some of the requirements of the Building Safety Act which require what might yet be subject to a ‘strict liability regime’. The language put forward in the report treads similar ground and we refer to the various considerations outlined in earlier documents.

10.

Contractors

The Inquiry generally found that contractors, fuelled by design and build forms of contract, take on responsibility for a broad range of work which is often sub contracted and often fail to understand who is responsible for what. They conclude that the construction industry as a whole needs to “become technically more competent and less willing to sacrifice quality to speed and cost.” The Inquiry recommends that a licensing system be introduced for those taking on work on higher risk buildings, ensuring that they are suitably experienced and competent. The belief is that this will, in turn, lead to a general increase in the level of competence across industry. As with architects, they recommend that a Gateway 2 application be supported by a personal undertaking from a director or senior manager of the principal contractor to take all reasonable care to ensure that on completion and handover the building is as safe as is required by the Building Regulations.” The fact that the Inquiry panel concluded that design and build contracts cause systemic problems in the industry is not surprising, but certainly a relief for those of us who have been saying similar things for decades. Perhaps it is finally time to consider an alternative means of procurement which fosters collaboration, the taking of responsibility and the fair share of risk and reward across the supply chain, rather than putting more sticking plasters over what is becoming an increasingly indefensible position. We have had Dame Judith’s review of the Building Regulations which came to similar conclusions. At what point does industry finally consider a better way? Comment:

11.

Building Control

The Inquiry found that all too often building control was not only seen to be an extension of the design team and a source of advice and assistance, but also that

was often how building control itself saw the role. The Inquiry believes that this must change. They cite the introduction of commercial interests within the profession as a key driver behind the climate and the Inquiry recommends that Government appoint a panel to consider whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those with commercial interests in the process. The Inquiry also considers it might be appropriate for a national body to exercise those building control functions, rather than this being delegated to the local authorities. The Inquiry recommends that the panel consider this proposal as part of its remit.

Comment:

There is clearly a policy decision here for Government to take which is beyond the scope of our expertise. If competition is to be removed from building control, then care needs to be taken to ensure that construction doesn’t grind to a halt because a lack of capacity in local or national building control functions.

We will continue to read through the report and identify any issues which may impact our clients’ businesses and report back as needed. In the meantime, hopefully this gives us all a practical working knowledge of some of the key findings of the Inquiry and a basis for us all to learn more as this develops. Government have given themselves six months to respond, so we can expect to know the shape and scope of that response by early Spring 2025.